понедельник, 20 апреля 2009 г.

Microsoft has published regular Security Intelligence Report.

Russia is among leaders by infected computers percentage:
The infection metrics is about 21,1 for 1000 runs of "cleaner" , an world average index is 8,6. A very strange index.



It is possible that the index is strongly concerned with a possibility to infect different platforms:



I think nobody is surprised that a lot of home users with XP SP0, SP1 are afraid to update it because they are should that their cracked Windows versions will not further work. But will they have Malicious Software Removal Tool? Will a “master” bring on a floppy disk? Rather, something from Kaspersky or DrWeb.

This is a very strange situation. Can it really be corporate employees ?

PS. Actually this is a wonderful report.
The most common threat in Russia – Taterf which is spread through shared folders, in USA - Win32/Renos and Win32/Zlob. There are a lot data about Conficker in the report, but it is missed in statistics first lines.

Is it a wonder?

воскресенье, 12 апреля 2009 г.

Security in our life

I has taken a flight from Domodedovo airport (Moscow) recently, and thought a lot…
And my thoughts were hard… Hope, only in Britain and only on submarines.



PS. If somebody do not recognize – this is Symantec - Kido/Conficker/Downadup.

четверг, 19 марта 2009 г.

Webspider. Express vulnerability assesment

Concept preview of Webspider express security scanner (pure AJAX :) has been recently published – this is a tool that allows analyzing in seconds the software which is the most frequently used by attackers. The system is intended to make protection express analysis of Internet and Intranet users, users of electronic commerce systems and Internet provider clients.

You can test it here:

http://www.securitylab.ru/addons/webspider3/fast_check.php



The current version is able to detect a vulnerability in popular ActiveX components and plug-ins, Mozilla Firefox and Opera browsers, Java and Adobe Flash applications and also MS07-042, MS08-069 and MS09-002 updates.
We plan to publish a detailed article about the used techniques in April.

It's just preview, so be indulgently.

вторник, 10 марта 2009 г.

Positive Technologies Reasearch Lab

This year we decided to resume the publication of vulnerability details detected during researches and penetration testing.

http://en.securitylab.ru/lab/

In 2006, because of a number of reasons, we decided to shift the burden of publishing vulnerability details to software vendors and stop publishing the details about previously detected problems. However, many customers ask us to assist in vulnerability elimination in third-party vendor software. This induces us to resume the process.
The most interesting current problem (in my opinion) is a number of vulnerabilities in VMWare that allows attackers to gain access from guest to host OS. And right to the kernel.

I personally treated different methods to eliminate vulnerabilities in third-party vendor software, from Full-Disclosure extremism to selling vulnerabilities in the “white” market, for example, iDefense (http://labs.idefense.com/vcp/). Some thought are available here:
http://www.securitylab.ru/analytics/241826.php (Russian)

вторник, 24 февраля 2009 г.

We’ve published a network utility to check that security updates from MS08-065, MS08-067 and MS09-001 are installed in the system. The utility does not need administration privileges and works in pentest mode.
Feedback on the previous releases was quite positive, we decided to upgrade.




Additional info:
http://www.securitylab.ru/news/extra/368760.php

Downloads:
http://www.ptsecurity.com/download/pt-check-09-001.zip

понедельник, 26 января 2009 г.

Risks, risks, risks

I came across with vulnerabilities in UTM device management web interface during security analysis recently. Rather typical combination of CSRF and XSS is interesting because it allows attackers to get access to device command line and manage the system interactively in administrator’s browser. But this is not the whole point, the vulnerability is typicaly.
The most interesting (as always) was communication with the vendor. We did not agree about the vulnerability risk level that led to desperate correspondence. Here I would like to share with you our ideas in this field.
As a rule, risk level is set by software vendor or by a company that produces protection tools (vulnerability scanners, intrusion detection systems, etc.). In this case typical scheme similar to road regulations is used: low risk level (green), medium risk level (yellow), high risk level (red). Sometimes an additional 4th level is used – level of critical vulnerabilities.
Many producers use this approach, for example, Microsoft uses 4 vulnerability risk levels in its security bulletins.
But ‘traffic lights’ model is not transparent and greatly depends on expert world view and general state and other factors. That’s why we use CVSSv2 methodology.

English

http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html

Russian
http://www.securitylab.ru/analytics/355336.php
http://www.securitylab.ru/analytics/356476.php

Rather simple metrics on which CVSSv2 is based allows assessing risks more or less definitely. In addition, the metrics allows assessing several additional factors as exploitation possibility and environment that is very important.
Quotation (Russian):
Leaving aside advantages and disadvantages of the methods, the following characteristics could affect the assessment reliability:
  1. Context dependence;
  2. System configuration dependence;
  3. Assessment method dependence.
Vulnerabilities of the same type could be of different risk level in different applications. For example, CSRF vulnerability could not be a threat for typical representation server or search engine, but is a critical vulnerability for e-mail or payment system web interface. As a result of information leakage, an attacker could access application logs (low or medium risk level) or download the backup copy of the site (high risk level).
The system configuration could also affect the risk level. Thus, “SQL Injection” vulnerability is usually classified as a high risk level vulnerability. But if web application has restricted rights on DB server, it is a vulnerability of medium or low risk level. In another installation or implementation the same vulnerability could be used to access operating system with superuser rights that makes the vulnerability critical.
Assessment methods greatly affect vulnerability risk level. For the above example, a network scanner could just detect “SQL Injection” as a problem. To determine the available for potential attackers privileges one should try to use the vulnerability or get detailed information about communications between web application and DB server via white box method.
So it is absolutely incorrect to give to different vulnerabilities of the same type equal risk levels without detailed analysis (for example, SQL Injection).
Here is an example.

Let’s assume that SQL Injection allows to get access to DBMS with minimum web server privileges, for example, db_reader. And web application does not store confidential data (for example, passwords) in DBMS.
So CVSSv2 vector and risk level are:
In the other case, if user passwords are stored in DBMS (including administrator password), risk level is higher as the system is more vulnerable to attacks according to data confidentiality.

(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:W/RC:C)= 8.1

If web server has unreasonably extended privileges on DB server, for example, sa privileges, the same vulnerability is much more dangerous:

(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:H/RL:W/RC:C) = 9.5

It we reduce it into “traffic lights” model or PCI DSS 5 levels (Urgent, Critical, High, Medium, Low), the result is:

1. Medium (2) and High (3)
2. Medium (2) and Critical (4)
3. High (3) and Urgent (>4).

It means that vulnerability risk level could vary greatly depending on the system and its settings.

CVSSv2 vector for XSS (see description above at the beginning of the note)

(AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:F/RL:W/RC:C) = 6.9

So in terms of PCI DSS (it is this model that is the most popular now) the risk level of the issue is High or even Critical, but not Low. But in any case the audit is failed :))

PS. I can understand vendor’s reasons, as if security is not taken into account when the software is designed then (quotation) "hardening the management interface would probably imply a complete redesign of it".

Here it is – the various risk assessment.

понедельник, 24 ноября 2008 г.

IE 8 and XSS

Here are the results of analysis of XSS filter built in current beta Internet Explorer 8. Colleagues from Microsoft have achieved rather good results – the most widespread attack vectors for the vulnerability are blocked.
If we take into account that XSS is the most widespread Web problem according to both Positive Technologies and international WASC statistics, the existence of such mechanisms in browsers is a useful initiative. I think Avir/HIPS developers should also care about this area.

There is a contracted summery below about filter efficiency against different attack vectors:

Stored version
No
DOM-Based
Partly
Reversed version
In tag
No
In Javascript
No
In HTML
Yes
In tag parameter
Yes

It is funny that the different vulnerability (HTTP Response Splitting) was detected that allows attackers to disable XSS protection. I hope the problem will be solved in the release version.